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ABSTRACT
“Virtual” molecular compounds, created in molecular
modeling software, are increasingly useful in the process of
rational drug design. When a physical compound is patented,
however, virtual use of the compound allows researchers to
circumvent the protection granted to the patentee. To acquire
protection from unauthorized use of compounds in their virtual
form, patentees must directly claim the virtual compound. But
Supreme Court decisions such as Bilski v. Kappos and Mayo
Collaborative Services v. Prometheus Laboratories, Inc. call into
question whether virtual compound claims are patentable subject
matter under § 101. Using the guidance offered by the Supreme
Court and Federal Circuit, this Issue Brief argues that virtual
compound claims are not abstract ideas and therefore, consistent
with patent policy, qualify as patentable subject matter.

INTRODUCTION
In 2000, the estimated cost of developing a new drug was $802
million.1 More recent estimates suggest the sum is actually around $2
billion.2 A large proportion of this cost involves identifying a substance that
shows promise as a starting point for a new drug. This substance is
identified in drug discovery as the lead compound.3
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Following the discovery of the lead compound, the traditional
method of drug design involves consistently altering the lead compound to
identify a safe and potent compound worth the expense of clinical trials.4
However, even after identifying a lead compound, the odds are still 1 in
10,000 that drugs identified as “promising” will result in a commercialized
product.5 In fact, the primary expenditure in drug design is failure.6
The traditional method of drug design requires iterating through
possibly thousands of compounds in the search for a commercially viable
drug.7 This process is expensive in both labor and equipment.8 One study
showed that this “discovery phase” incurs 68 percent of the actual cost for
each drug placed on the market for consumers.9 Costs increase even more if
a company has to license the lead compound from a patentee to perform
experiments.10
The use of computer-aided drug design employing computational
chemistry reduces experimentation costs by eliminating the need for
multiple, repetitive reactions.11 In the 1990s and early 2000s, the
pharmaceutical industry believed that the possibility of generating virtual
lead compounds entirely through computer simulation, known as de novo
design, would revolutionize the industry.12 Unfortunately, limitations in

4

Id.
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ACTION 8 (2d ed. 2004).
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02/10/the-truly-staggering-cost-of-inventing-new-drugs/.
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million cost for each drug placed on the market for consumers is in discovering the
compound.
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computing power limited the effectiveness of de novo design.13 Many in the
industry deemed de novo design a failure.14
Despite some of the historical failures and concerns surrounding
computer-aided drug design, patent practitioners need be aware of the
patent issues surrounding virtual compounds because of their current and
possible future role in drug design. Rapid advances in computing power
make it reasonably likely that in the future, de novo design will become a
viable mode of drug design. And in the mean time, another technique
utilizing virtual compounds, known as drug optimization, still makes
virtual-compound patent concerns relevant.15
Whereas de novo design begins the entire process from mere
theoretical knowledge, drug optimization, like the traditional method,
begins with a previously identified lead compound. The structure of that
compound, bound with its receptor, is analyzed by x-ray crystallography.16
The potency of the lead compound is then optimized by generating and
predicting the binding of potential derivatives using mass screening and
combinatorial chemistry.17
Unlike the traditional method, however, drug optimization does not
use the actual compound. Therefore, a company may not need to license the
lead compound from the patentee for purposes of virtual experimentation.
On the other hand, any claim directed to the compound in virtual form
would likely come under § 101 scrutiny as to whether or not the claim is
patentable subject matter, especially given the recent Supreme Court cases
Bilski v. Kappos18 and Mayo Collaborative Services v. Prometheus
Laboratories, Inc.19
This Issue Brief proceeds in two Parts. Part I addresses whether or
not patents on lead compounds protect the patentee from unauthorized use
of the compounds in virtual form. Part II analyzes the current law to
determine whether virtual compound claims are patentable subject matter. A
brief Conclusion follows.
13
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subject matter).
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See Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Laboratories, Inc, 132 S. Ct. 1289
(2012) (holding that a patent application claiming a method for using the
measurement of metabolites of an applied drug to decide whether to increase or
decrease drug dosage was not patentable subject matter).
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I. INFRINGEMENT
Suppose Researcher A develops lead compound X in the laboratory
and patents it. During the lifetime of that patent, Researcher B uses X under
the traditional method to find the most promising alteration, drug Y.
Assuming Researcher B has no license to use X, he has infringed Researcher
A’s patent.20
Now imagine that instead of using the traditional method of drug
design, Researcher B used Researcher A’s patent to input the spatial
coordinates of compound X into molecular modeling software. Using
computer-aided drug design, Researcher B is quickly able to determine the
reactivity of X with other compounds and simulates reactions of X until she
finds the most promising alteration, drug Y. In this case, there is no
infringement.
Why the difference? The United States Patent Act provides that
patent infringement occurs when anyone “without authority makes, uses,
offers to sell, or sells any patented invention, within the United States . . .
during the term of the patent therefor.”21 A court determines whether
infringement has occurred using a “two-step analysis”: First, it construes the
claim in question to determine its scope and meaning; and second, it
compares the construed claim to the invention accused of infringement.22
For a typical compound claim, a court would likely find that there is no
infringement.23

A. Prong One: Claim Construction
The claim-construction prong of the test is specific to the actual
claim being litigated. When construing claims, the court initially examines
intrinsic evidence, such as the patent’s specification and prosecution
history.24 In the absence of a novel meaning to a claim term, the court gives
claim terms their ordinary meaning to one skilled in the art.25

20

See Madey v. Duke Univ., 307 F.3d 1351, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (holding that
uses with “the slightest commercial implication” are disqualified from the common
law experimental-use exception).
21
35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (2012).
22
Tate Access Floors, Inc. v. Maxcess Techs., Inc., 222 F.3d 958, 964 (Fed Cir.
2000).
23
The patent infringement analysis would be similar even if the patent claimed the
atomic coordinates of the compound instead of just the compound itself. See Ted L.
Field, Comment, Computer-Aided Drug Design Using Patented Compounds:
Infringement in Cyberspace?, 34 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 1001, 1018 (2001).
24
Victronics Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc., 90 F.3d 1576, 1582–84 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
25
Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1321 (Fed. Cir. 2005).

No. 1]

DUKE LAW & TECHNOLOGY REVIEW

29

For purposes of this analysis, assume that the claim for the patented
compound X reads, “A compound of [a given] formula . . . or a
pharmaceutically acceptable salt, wherein [lists elements].”26 The words in
play would be “compound” and “pharmaceutically acceptable salt,” though
terms such as “composition” or “crystal” are often used as well. Here,
assume there are no specific definitions in the intrinsic evidence for the
terms “compound” or “pharmaceutically acceptable salt.” Accordingly, the
court would refer to the ordinary meaning of the term “compound,” for
example, “substances occurring naturally or produced artificially by the
reaction of two or more ingredients.”27 Similarly, a court could define a
“pharmaceutically acceptable salt” as “any salt derived from a
pharmaceutically acceptable inorganic or organic acid or base.”28

B. Prong Two: Comparison of the Claim to the Infringing Invention
For an accused invention to infringe a patent claim, the fact-finder
must find that it embodies “every limitation of the patent claim.”29 Assume
that Researcher B created a virtual representation of the compound patented
above. Researcher B did not make a “compound” or a “pharmaceutically
acceptable salt” but instead made a representation of the compound using
information disclosed by the patent. A patent on a compound protects only
the actual compound and not a representation of that compound.30
Therefore, the virtual compound does not embody every (or even any)
element of the claim, making it likely that the factfinder would find that
Researcher B did not directly infringe on the patented compound X.

C. Infringement Under the Doctrine of Equivalents
Researcher A might still argue that Researcher B’s use of the
patented compound X in virtual form is infringing, under the doctrine of
equivalents. This doctrine is based on the idea that “if two devices do the
same work in substantially the same way, and accomplish substantially the
26

See, e.g., U.S. Patent No. 8,263,585, claim 1 (issued Sept. 11, 2012).
E.g., Pharmacia Labs. Inc. v. U. S., 609 F.2d 491, 493 n.3 (C.C.P.A. 1979)
(providing the definition from the Tariff Schedules of the U.S. Annotated).
28
E.g., U.S. Patent No 7,138,404 col. 3:56–58 (filed Nov. 21, 2006) (providing a
definition for the term as used in this patent).
29
Tate Access Floors, Inc. v. Maxcess Techs., Inc., 222 F.3d 958, 964 (Fed. Cir.
2000).
30
In re Papesch, 315 F.2d 381, 391 (C.C.P.A. 1963). Judge Rich wrote that “the
graphic formulae [and] the chemical nomenclature . . . are symbols by which
compounds can be identified, classified, and compared. But a formula is not a
compound and while it may serve in a claim to identify what is being patented, as
the meted and bounds of a deed identify a plot of land, the thing that is patented is
not the formula but the compound identified by it.” Id.
27
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same result, they are the same, even though they differ in name, form or
shape.”31
One of the generally accepted tests for equivalence—implementing
this general principle—is the function-way-result test.32 Under this test,
each element of the claim must be examined to determine whether the
accused compound performs substantially the same function, in
substantially the same way, and accomplishes substantially the same result
as the claimed compound.33 The test of equivalence is applied to the
“individual elements of the claim, not to the invention as a whole.”34
There is at least a colorable argument that the computer
representation embodies an equivalent of each element in the patent claim.
The Federal Circuit has found that software implementations of similar
functionality are equivalent: “[i]ndeed, we have upheld determinations of
equivalence on the ground that hardware and software implementations of a
component of an invention are interchangeable substitutes.”35 According to
this argument, each virtual atom does the same thing as the physical atoms
of the physical compound by interacting with virtual atoms of candidate
drug molecules. Each virtual atom interacts the same way according to
known laws of chemistry and physics, and each virtual atom achieves the
same result by helping determine how candidate drug molecules will react
with the patented compound.36
Another test for equivalence is the “insubstantial differences” test,
which asks if there was “only an insubstantial change” in the element.37
Under this test, Researcher A could argue that the difference between the
actual patented compound and the virtual compound is insubstantial, given
that the atoms are positioned in the same position relative to each other in
both, and that the virtual compound’s use is practically identical to the
patented compound’s use. Likewise, A might argue that the difference
relates to the form, rather than the function, of the compound, because
whether or not the compound is virtual or physical, it contains the same

31

Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Prods. Co., 339 U.S. 605, 608 (1950).
See id. This test is also known as the “triple identity test.” See, e.g., Roger
Barrett, Discretionary Use of the Doctrine of Equivalents in Patent Law: Going
Beyond the Triple Identity Test of Graver Tank, 17 U. HAW. L. REV. 513 (1995).
33
Graver Tank, 339 U.S. at 608.
34
Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 29 (1997).
35
Interactive Pictures Corp. v. Infinite Pictures, Inc., 274 F.3d 1371, 1383 (Fed.
Cir. 2001).
36
Field, supra note 23.
37
Hilton Davis Chem. Co. v. Warner-Jenkinson Co., Inc., 62 F.3d 1512, 1517 (Fed.
Cir. 1995), rev’d on other grounds, Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem.
Co., 520 U.S. 17, 29 (1997).
32
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spatial coordinates of atoms and they react in the exact same way.38 It
would, after all, be unjust for the competitor to “exploit the . . . significant
efforts and costs incurred by the patentee . . . in identifying, isolating, and
effectively producing [the compound].”39
Despite these arguments, a court would likely not find equivalence
between the use of computer representations of atoms and the patented
compound itself.40 A court would almost certainly reject equivalence under
the function-way-result test given that the arrangement and interaction of
elements in the virtual compound do not follow the laws of chemistry and
physics like the arrangement of elements in the real patented compound.41
Instead, they interact according to a pre-programmed mathematical
algorithm that simulates those laws using today’s imperfect models.42
Similarly, a court using the insubstantial-differences test would reject
equivalence because of the fundamental difference between the composition
of actual and virtual compounds. The claims at issue here require actual
compounds composed of actual atoms. The virtual representations of the
patented compound are fundamentally different from the physical
compound itself—the latter actually reacts and is composed of the specific
atoms, whereas the former is merely a software representation that reacts
with other software representations.

II. THE VIRTUAL FORM OF A CHEMICAL COMPOUND UNDER § 101
Given that a patent does not protect a compound from the use of its
spatial coordinates in a computer system, it might seem obvious that the
way to protect the compound from virtual use is to patent the virtual
compound itself. However, Bilski and other recent Federal Circuit and
Supreme Court cases may call into question the patentability of such claims
under § 101.
Section 101 defines patentable subject matter to include
“process[es], machine[s], manufacture[s], and composition[s] of matter.”43
The text of § 101 also states that a claim falling into “any” one of these
categories satisfies the subject-matter requirement.44 The USPTO’s
guidelines elaborate on these criteria: A claimed invention “(1) must be
38

See Trevor J. Smedley & Ross A. Dannenberg, Enforceability of Machine
Patents in Virtual Worlds, 13 J. INTERNET L. 1, 16–17 (2010) (arguing that in a
virtual world a virtual mousetrap is equivalent to a real one).
39
Jeffrey P. Kushan, Comment, Protein Patents and the Doctrine of Equivalents:
Limits on the Expansion of Patent Rights, 6 HIGH TECH. L.J. 109, 111 (1991).
40
See Field, supra note 23, at 1018.
41
See NAG & DEY, supra note 3, at 9.
42
Id.
43
35 U.S.C. § 101 (2012).
44
Id.
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directed to one of the four statutory categories, and (2) must not be wholly
directed to subject matter encompassing a judicially recognized
exception.”45 These judicial exceptions include abstract ideas, physical
phenomena, and laws of nature.46 Therefore, to determine the patentability
of virtual compounds, a court must determine first, which of the statutory
categories they fall within, and second, whether claims directed to virtual
compounds are abstract ideas.
Virtual compound claims can be phrased to fit in many of the
statutory categories; frequently, they are phrased as process claims.47 It can
be more difficult to determine whether such a claim is directed to an
abstract idea,48 but the Supreme Court’s application of the “inventive
concept” test in Prometheus provides some guidance.49 When a claim
applies a law of nature or an abstract idea “to a known structure or
process,”50 the Court has insisted that it “contain other elements or a
combination of elements . . . sufficient to ensure that the patent in practice
amounts to significantly more than a patent upon the natural law itself.”51
When a claim contains such additional elements, they constitute an
“inventive step” that makes it patent-eligible.52

A. Computer-Implemented Claims and Abstract Ideas
Virtual compounds are by nature intangible and exist only in a
digital environment. Seemingly the epitome of an “abstract” idea, the only
thing concrete or real about a virtual compound is the computer running the
simulation and the projected image on the screen. While computer programs

45

U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFFICE, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, MANUAL OF
PATENT EXAMINING PROCEDURE § 2106 (8th ed., 9th rev. Aug. 2012) [hereinafter
MPEP].
46
Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 185 (1981).
47
For an example of a process claim, see infra notes 83–84 and accompanying text.
48
Even the Federal Circuit has difficulty applying the Supreme Court’s standards in
this determination. For examples of the Supreme Court recently vacating or
reversing Federal Circuit decisions, see Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus
Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289 (2012); WildTangent, Inc. v. Ultramercial, LLC, 132 S.
Ct. 2431 (2012), granting cert., vacating and remanding Ultramercial, LLC v.
Hulu, LLC, 657 F.3d 1323 (Fed. Cir. 2011); Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218,
3225 (2010).
49
Prometheus, 132. S. Ct. at 1294.
50
Id. (quoting Diehr, 450 U.S. at 187).
51
Id. (citing Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 594 (1978); Bilski, 130 S. Ct. at 3230).
52
Id.
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per se are abstract and non-patentable,53 many computer-implemented
processes have been found to be patentable subject matter.54
To determine whether a claim is directed to an abstract idea, the
Federal Circuit created the machine-or-transformation test, under which “[a]
claimed process is surely patent-eligible under § 101 if: (1) it is tied to a
particular machine or apparatus, or (2) it transforms a particular article into
a different state or thing.”55 The Supreme Court has held that the “machineor-transformation test” is an “important clue”—though not dispositive—to
the patentability of a process.56 Using this test, the question for many
inventions has become: “[I]s a general-purpose computer a ‘specific
machine’”?57
A general-purpose computer can qualify as a specific machine
under the machine-or-transformation test. However, the connection to the
physical world provided by the computer is not enough, by itself, to
transform an abstract concept into patentable subject matter.58 Instead, the
addition of a machine must “impose a meaningful limit on the scope of a
claim,” and “play a significant part in permitting the claimed method to be
performed.”59 In the 1994 case In re Alappat, the Federal Circuit held that a
general-purpose computer turns into a specially programmed computer once
programmed with specific software.60 Therefore, specially programmed
computers impose a meaningful limit on the claim and likely satisfy the
machine prong of the test.61
Alternatively, to pass the transformation prong of the machine-ortransformation test, the process must transform an article into a different
state.62 Often, the courts look to see whether the process can be performed
mentally.63 In Gottschalk v. Benson, for example, the Supreme Court found
that a method of programming a general-purpose computer to convert
binary-coded numbers into pure binary through a mathematical algorithm
53

See MPEP § 2106; see also Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 72 (1972).
See, e.g., Research Corp. Techs., Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 627 F.3d 859, 868 (Fed.
Cir. 2010); In re Alappat, 33 F.3d 1526 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
55
In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 954 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
56
Bilski v. Kappos 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3227, 3235 (2010) (Stevens, J., concurring); id.
at 3258 (Breyer, J., concurring).
57
Mark A. Lemley et al., Life After Bilski, 63 STAN. L. REV. 1315, 1323 (2011).
58
Fort Props., Inc. v. Am. Master Lease LLC, 671 F.3d 1317, 1322 (Fed. Cir.
2012).
59
SiRF Tech., Inc. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 601 F.3d 1319, 1333 (Fed. Cir. 2010).
60
In re Alappat, 33 F.3d 1526, 1545 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
61
See id.
62
In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 954 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
63
See, e.g., Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 67, 71–72 (1972); CyberSource
Corp. v. Retail Decisions, Inc., 654 F.3d 1366, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
54
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was not patent-eligible because the calculations could be performed
mentally.64
By contrast, in SiRF Technology, Inc. v. International Trade
Commission, the Federal Circuit found that a process was patentable
because the calculations to determine the position of a GPS receiver could
not be performed entirely by the human mind.65 Similarly, the Federal
Circuit in Research Corp. Technologies, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp. found that
a method that manipulated computer data structures (like pixels of a digital
image) and output a modified computer data structure was patentable
subject matter.66 Since the human mind could not practically perform this
entire function, the Federal Circuit found that the transformation of the
computer data structures into a different data structure was not an abstract
idea.67
In the same vein and for the same purpose as the mental-process
inquiry, courts look to see how integral a machine is to the performance of
the claim. The process claimed in SiRF was patentable subject matter
because it was impossible to generate ranges necessary to determine the
position of the GPS receiver without the use of a GPS receiver.68
Meanwhile, in CyberSource Corp. v. Retail Decisions, Inc., the method of
using the internet to verify credit card actions was found to be unpatentable
because the function of the internet was unnecessary to achieve the claim’s
objective.69 Instead of actually performing a transformation, the internet
acted as a data collector.70 The Federal Circuit found this function
insufficient to deem the internet necessary to the claim.71
The breadth of a claim is an additional factor—expansive coverage
weighs against the claim’s patentability because courts want to prevent
claims “that too broadly preempt the use of a natural law.”72 The patent

64

Benson, 409 U.S. at 67.
See SiRF Tech., Inc. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 601 F.3d 1319, 1333 (Fed. Cir.
2010).
66
See Research Corp. Techs., Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 627 F.3d 859, 868 (Fed. Cir.
2010).
67
Id.
68
SiRF, 601 F.3d at 1333.
69
CyberSource Corp. v. Retail Decisions, Inc., 654 F.3d 1366, 1375 (Fed. Cir.
2011).
70
Id.
71
Id.
72
Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1294
(2012).
65
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system was intended to foster and not foreclose innovation.73 Since all
inventions at some level utilize abstract ideas and natural law, innovation is
“preempted” when a patent disproportionately ties up the use of underlying
abstract ideas.74 The Supreme Court has “repeatedly emphasized . . . patent
law [must] not inhibit further discovery by improperly tying up the future
use of laws of nature.”75 Because broader claims preempt more ideas than
narrow claims, courts are more likely to find that they cover abstract ideas
necessary for innovation.
The patentability of computer-implemented processes is a hotly
contested issue with little certainty as to what constitutes patentable subject
matter. Hoping to clarify the governing law, the Federal Circuit granted a
petition for rehearing en banc in CLS Bank International v. Alice Corp.,
requesting briefing on the appropriate test to determine “whether a
computer-implemented invention is a patent ineligible ‘abstract idea,’” and
when, if ever, “the presence of a computer in a claim lend[s] patent
eligibility to an otherwise patent-ineligible idea.”76 In Alice, the patent-insuit claimed a computer trading platform for exchanging obligations in
which a trusted third party settled obligations between a first and second
party so as to eliminate “settlement risk.”77
Despite the Federal Circuit’s desire to bring consistency to the law,
the Alice decision seemed to reflect the difficulty of the question of
determining patentable subject matter. It contained “seven separate opinions
reflecting at least three distinct approaches,” with no single opinion
garnering more than five judges’ support.78 The plurality opinion in Alice
determined that the method claim did not cover patent-eligible material
because there was “nothing in the asserted method claims that represent[ed]
‘significantly more’ than the underlying abstract idea for purposes of §
101.”79 Judge Lourie, writing for the plurality, stated that “[u]nless the
claims require a computer to perform operations that are not merely
accelerated calculations, a computer does not itself confer patent
73

See Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 6 (1966) (addressing the
“constitutional command” that the patent system “must ‘promote the Progress of . .
. useful Arts’” (quoting U.S. CONST. art I, § 8, cl. 8)).
74
Prometheus, 132 S. Ct. at 1294.
75
Id. at 1301.
76
CLS Bank Int’l v. Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd., 484 F. App’x 559, 559 (Fed. Cir. 2012)
(granting request for rehearing en banc).
77
CLS Bank Int'l v. Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd., 717 F.3d 1269, 1284–85 (Fed. Cir.
2013).
78
Bernard Chao, Interpreting CLS Bank Int’l v. Alice, PATENTLY-O BLOG (Sept. 3,
2013, 3:08 PM), http://www.patentlyo.com/patent/2013/09/interpreting-cls-bankintl-v-alice.html.
79
Alice, 717 F.3d at 1287.
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eligibility.”80 Judge Rader, however, noted that “nothing” in the CLS
Bank Int'l decision “beyond [the] judgment has the weight of precedent.”81

B. The Effect of Federal Circuit and Supreme Court Decisions on
Virtual Compounds
For purposes of determining whether virtual compounds are
patentable subject matter, it is helpful to analyze a sample claim. Since most
of the claims contested in major § 101 decisions have been process claims,
this analysis will utilize a sample process claim. However, patent eligibility
does not depend merely on the form of the claim but instead on whether the
claim’s “inventive concept” amounts to something significantly more than
an abstract idea or natural law.82 Consider the following process claim from
U.S. Patent No 6,083,711:
1. A method of identifying a candidate inhibitor compound capable of
binding to, and inhibiting the proteolytic activity of, an alpha, or beta
herpes protease, said method comprising:
a) introducing into a computer program information derived from
atomic coordinate defining an active site conformation of a herpes
protease molecule based upon three-dimensional structure
determination comprising a catalytically active site formed by at least
the interaction of three amino acids Serine, Histidine and Histidine,
wherein said program utilizes or displays the three-dimensional
structure thereof;
b) generating a three dimensional representation of the active site
cavity of said protease in said computer program;
c) superimposing a model of the inhibitor test compound on the model
of said active site of said protease;
d) assessing whether said test compound model fits spatially into the
active site of said protease . . . .83

This claim can be broken down into simpler terms. The first step in the
claim requires entering the virtual compound’s coordinates into a computer
program. The second step utilizes the computer to transform the coordinates
into a three-dimensional structure. The third step requires the computer to
superimpose a model of the test compound onto the active site of the virtual
compound. The fourth step requires an assessment of the fit of the two
compounds.
80

Id. at 1286.
Id. at 1292 n.1.
82
See supra notes 48–52 and accompanying text.
83
U.S. Patent No 6,083,711 cols. 61–66 l. 25–51 (filed May 9, 1997). The patentees
claimed a method for using their previously patented herpes protease compound in
computer-aided drug design of possible herpes protease inhibitors.
81

No. 1]

DUKE LAW & TECHNOLOGY REVIEW

37

Upon first glance, the immediate concern about the claim is that it
only mentions a computer program, without specific mention of a machine.
However, this concern need not affect the analysis of the claim; patent
eligibility does not “depend simply on the draftsman’s art.”84 Logically, the
use of a computer program necessitates the use of a computer. While claims
are not patentable simply because of computer implementation, they may be
deserving of patent protection if they apply an abstract idea to a known
structure or process in a way that demonstrates an “inventive concept.”85
It remains to be determined whether this claim is directed to an
abstract idea. One argument that it is might take the following form: The
“inventive concept” is embodied in step four (part d) of the sample claim,
which merely looks at two structures and inspects whether they fit. This is
an abstract idea because the ability to determine fit is a mental process. The
other two steps merely add a “generic computer function to facilitate
performance” that is not enough to satisfy § 101.86 Accordingly, just like the
claim in Alice, the sample claim’s use of a computer merely accelerates
calculations.87
However, this simplification fails to recognize two other inventive
concepts: the virtualization of a specific man-made compound by its atomic
coordinates, and the utilization of a computer to produce a threedimensional structure created from the coordinates. Step two of the claimed
process involves the generation of a three-dimensional structure from
atomic coordinates. It is infeasible for the human mind to superimpose a
virtual test compound onto an active site of the virtual compound for
purposes of determining its fit.88 Unlike the method claimed in Alice, a
human could not feasibly perform the task. In fact, most computers have
trouble performing the necessary calculations because “the computational
resources required to obtain exact . . . solutions . . . on a conventional
computer generally increase exponentially with the number of atoms
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Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1294
(2012) (quoting Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 593 (1978)).
85
See supra notes 48–52 and accompanying text.
86
CLS Bank Intern. v. Alice Corp., 717 F.3d 1269, 1287 (Fed. Cir. 2013).
87
See id.
88
See SCOTT E. UMBAUGH, COMPUTER IMAGING, DIGITAL ANALYSIS AND PROCESS
5 (2005) (arguing that computer imaging is necessary when large database of data
needs to be analyzed, because computer generated images enable humans to
interpret this type of data).
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involved.”89 The computer provides “the entire detailed ‘solution,’ without
which it would be impossible to achieve the invention’s purpose.”90
The sample claim more closely resembles the claim from Research
Corp. than the claim at issue in Benson and therefore should be patentable
like the claim from Research Corp. In Benson, the claim covered a method
of programming a general computer to convert binary-coded decimal
numbers into pure binary through a mathematical algorithm.91 Although the
conversion of code in Benson might appear superficially similar to the
conversion of atomic coordinate data into a virtual three dimensional image,
the Benson claim involved inputs and outputs of a similar form—numbers
converted into numbers. On the other hand, the conversion in this claim
involves a form change from coordinates to spatial representation. It is
simply not plausible that a human could mentally construct the spatial
representation of a compound using its atomic coordinates.
While the machine-or-transformation test does not definitively
prove the patentability of the sample claim,92 the process’s use of a
computer supports the patentability of the claim. In Alappat, the Federal
Circuit found that use of a specific program on a general-purpose computer
makes the computer a specific machine.93 Here, the sample claim is tied to a
“specific machine” because the process claimed requires entering spatial
coordinates into a specific computer program.94 Any general computer
lacking these specific programs would be incapable of performing the
method.
Generating a three-dimensional representation of a compound from
atomic coordinates is nearly impossible without that computer program. No
other medium could generate the representation of the two compounds in a
way that accurately could represent the compounds. Even with a computer,
accurate portrayal of the compound is limited;95 without the computer,
89

B.P. Lanyon, et. al., Towards Quantum Chemistry on a Quantum Computer, 2
NATURE CHEMISTRY 106, 106 (2010), available at http://arxiv.org/pdf/
0905.0887.pdf.
90
See CLS Bank Intern. v. Alice, 717 F.3d 1269, 1320 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (Moore, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part).
91
Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 67 (1972).
92
Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3227 (2010) (“This Court’s precedents
establish that the machine-or-transformation test is a useful and important clue, an
investigative tool, for determining whether some claimed inventions are processes
under § 101. The machine-or-transformation test is not the sole test for deciding
whether an invention is a patent-eligible ‘process.’”).
93
In re Alappat, 33 F.3d 1526, 1545 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
94
U.S. Patent No 6,083,711 cols. 61–66 l. 25–51 (filed May 9, 1997).
95
See NAG & DEY, supra note 3, at 9 (observing that a lack of computing power
has limited the use of computer-aided drug design).
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effective portrayal would be impossible. The entire purpose of the claim is
to use computer evaluation systems to quickly, easily, and cheaply examine
compound inhibition of the virtual compound.96 This purpose is thwarted
without the use of the programmed computer. Just as the GPS receiver in
SiRF was necessary to generate ranges to fulfill the goal of the claim,97 the
computer in the sample process is necessary to generate the threedimensional structure required to fulfill the claim’s purpose.
The narrow nature of the sample claim also favors patentability.98
The Supreme Court has repeatedly warned against upholding patents that
too broadly preempt a natural law. Virtual compound claims written like the
sample claim preempt practically no natural law given the very limited use
of one virtual compound in a computer system for purposes of computeraided drug design. The sample claim would fail to preempt even an
identical claim using different atomic coordinates because not “every
limitation of the patent claim” would be identical.99

C. Patentability of Virtual Compounds and Patent Policy
By protecting virtual compounds, the patent system achieves its
economic objectives.100 The patent system prevents the inventor’s
compound from being used without authorization. As a result of the
patentability of virtual compounds, the patent system entitles the inventor to
a reward for her investment and sacrifice in developing the compound and
ensures that others do not piggy back on that investment. Inventors are
incentivized to continue developing drugs because the patent system gives
them a monopoly over the compound in both physical and virtual form.
The patentability of virtual compounds also promotes the disclosure
objective of the patent system. A researcher who discovered a promising
target compound might refuse to reveal its formula, instead relying on trade
secret law, if patent protection did not extend to cyberspace.101 However,
96

U.S. Patent No 6,083,711 col. 26:61–65 (filed May 9, 1997) (“[U]sing these
computer evaluation systems, a large number of compounds may be quickly and
easily examined and expensive and lengthy biochemical testing avoided. Moreover,
the need for actual synthesis of many compounds is effectively eliminated.”).
97
See SiRF Tech., Inc. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 601 F.3d 1319, 1333 (Fed. Cir.
2010).
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See Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1294
(2012) (citing O’Reilly v. Morse, 56 U.S. 62, 112–120 (1854)).
99
Tate Access Floors, Inc. v. Maxcess Techs., Inc., 222 F.3d 958, 964 (Fed. Cir.
2000).
100
See Field, supra note 23, at 1019–23 (discussing the underlying policies of
patent law and how cyberspace protection of chemical compounds suits them).
101
Admittedly, the value of today’s pharmaceutical patents makes it unlikely that a
researcher would refuse to patent the compound even if lacking virtual compound
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with appropriate coverage in both concrete and virtual form, the researcher
will be able to disclose the invention without losing his exclusive rights
granted by the patent system.

CONCLUSION
Under current patent law, a patented compound would not be
infringed by the use of the same compound in virtual form. However,
specifically claiming the compound in virtual form would ensure protection
from virtual infringement and would pass the § 101 inquiry due to the
integral nature of the computer, the impossibility of executing the process
mentally, and the narrow nature of a virtual compound claim. The
patentability of virtual compounds achieves fairness for the inventor and the
public in accordance with patent policy objectives.

protection. However, without virtual compound protection, future advances in
computer technology may decrease researcher’s desire to disclose for a patent of
the compound in physical form due the possible ease of using the compound in
virtual form to create more effective drugs.

